The Russian invasion of Ukraine highlights the importance of technology in modern warfare. One prominent example is the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are used in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles or are otherwise used to carry explosive ordnance–especially first-person-view (FPV) drones. While COTS-UAVs have been used by state military forces for over two decades, they have also been adopted and modified by non-state actors to make up for capability gaps vis-à-vis regular militaries. These modifications, such as range extenders and payload dispensers, served as the inspiration for the adoption of COTS-UAVs by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to counter Russian armored vehicles, overcome entrenched ground forces, and improve artillery targeting. This analysis examines this adoption and alteration of UAV technology through the lens of adoption capacity theory (ACT) and military adaptation, hypothesizing that the UAF have adopted COTS-UAVs as a response to the technology and tactics of the adversarial force and due to both their low cost and tactical utility.
The adaptability of any military force is central to its success. The pressure applied to Ukraine since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 has forced the former to adapt, with unprecedented success. David Barno and Nora Bensahel identify two primary methods of military adaptation. First, the tactical: a bottom-up approach of responding to battlefield problems by modifying or developing technologies. Second, the institutional: a top-down approach that modifies existing or developing new weapons systems. The authors also make the important distinction between innovation and adaptation: the former occurring during peacetime, the latter during war. The Ukrainian use of COTS-UAVs falls within both categories as the UAF continues to adjust its drone tactics and strategy as operational needs arise, while also now being integrated into Ukrainian doctrine. This adaptation relies on the capacity of the UAF to swiftly and broadly adopt these new technologies. Horowitz theorizes that beyond the introduction of a technology, its full strategic integration is necessary to maximize its utility. Under adoptive capacity theory, he also posits that this relies on a state’s financial and organizational capability to adapt the technology into its structures. The transformation of COTS-UAVs from a tool for non-state actors into an integrated UAF weapon is a clear example of a military innovation with a low financial barrier to adoption. While it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the balance of power globally, it has greatly contributed to the UAF’s capacity to counter the Russian invasion.
Tracing this process of COTS-UAV adoption by the UAF serves as an effective case study in understanding the spread of an innovation as an adaptive response to an existential threat. COTS-UAV adoption has extreme values on both variables of the ACT theory (low financial intensity and low organizational capacity), complicating the assessment of the role of each variable. Andrea and Mauro Gilli recognize this issue while discussing the hand grenade as an innovation during the early 20th century. The grenade, inexpensive and easy to employ, required no significant shift in armies’ organizational structure or culture other than some very basic training. Thus, it spread quickly and widely among military forces before and during World War I. Yet its long-term impact has been difficult to study. In comparison, modified COTS-UAVs have had an outsized impact in Ukraine and have been adapted for specific purposes. Hence, it serves as an appropriate case for analysis within both the framework of ACT and of adaptation.
The Russian invasion epitomizes full-scale warfare – almost every technology available, commercial, or military, has been deployed. To be successful, however, new technology must exploit a strategic advantage. Modified COTS-UAVs have been used in Ukraine since 2014, their use spreading rapidly on both sides, but particularly by Ukraine. The UAF amassed thousands of drones and is losing, by some estimates, up to 10,000 commercial drones per month. This usage was accelerated by necessity and adaptability. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, commercial UAVs were used predominantly for ISR to assist with artillery targeting. The full-scale invasion necessitated an expansion of their role. The thousands of armored fighting vehicles used by Russia and the entrenched troops along the frontline are ideal targets for UAVs modified to act as remote delivery systems of munitions. Videos from COTS UAV successfully dropping anti-tank munitions on armored vehicles and grenades on entrenched soldiers are widespread online. COTS UAVs are also less expensive than current anti-tank weapons and user training is faster and easier.
For example, a Javelin anti-tank missile costs approximately $250,000, while a DJI-Mavic 3 (a popular consumer drone) is only around $2,000. Both can destroy a Russian tank (assuming a suitable munition is attached to the UAV) from a safe distance – 2,500m for the Javelin and up to 15,000m for the Mavic. U.S. Army troops are trained for at least two weeks on the Javelin. The most basic UAV training can take only a few days. A recent report has highlighted that small drones are destroying twice as many Russian vehicles as every other Ukrainian weapon combined, further exemplifying the cost-benefit ratio of COTS-UAVs.
Another driver of this adoption has been the organizational capital of the UAF. Three noticeable examples highlight this dynamic. First, the partnership between Aerorozvidka, a group of drone hobbyists modifying UAVs, and the UAF. This has resulted in UAV training across the Ukrainian armed forces, allowing Ukrainian troops to practice using modified UAVs. Second, the cooperation between the UAF and Ukrainian arms manufacturers: many now produce specially designed shells or landmine dispensers for use with COTS-UAVs. Finally, the Ukrainian officials and the United24 fundraising platform have partnered to raise drone-designated funds. Similarly, the Ukrainian military has adopted and modified other unmanned systems, including unmanned naval vessels and land-based drones, both as weapons delivery platforms.
The swift, widespread, and systematic adoption of commercial UAVs throughout the echelons of the Ukrainian armed forces suggests that tactical and institutional adaptation can occur simultaneously if the necessary organizational capital and tactical incentives are present. This argument is strengthened by Russia’s parallel use of COTS UAVs, also embraced (to a lesser degree) by officials in government and the military, as illustrated by the creation of UAV training centers, combat drone pilot conferences, and structured fundraising efforts. This doctrinal adoption of technology places (modified) COTS UAVs as requiring low financial and low organizational capital for its adoption within the framework of ACT. This implies that, while highly effective as applied by the Ukrainian armed forces, commercial UAVs are unlikely to be structurally significant within the global security environment. This finding supports prior research, which argues that drones have not yet revolutionized war. As the war continues and more empirical data is collected and made available, the systematic study of commercial drones used in Ukraine may provide data-based evidence of the effect of drones and enable further research. At this early stage of structural adoption, the widespread use of commercial UAVs in the largest war in Europe since World War Two raises many questions. Future research on COTS UAVS in military operations may include identifying their space within existing legal structures, understanding the role of their producers, and evaluating their successes and shortcomings against those of purpose-built military drones
While by no means a comprehensive review of the use of commercial drones by the opposing forces currently at war in Ukraine, this article serves as a starting point for exploring the place of commercial UAVs within the wider debates on technology in war. The systematic adoption of modified COTS-UAVs by both the Ukrainian and Russian militaries illustrates the importance of organizational capital and tactical incentives to adapt during wartime. By examining these case studies through the ACT framework, the strategic potential and limits of COTS-UAVs come into sharper focus.
Andro Mathewson is a PhD student in War Studies at King’s College London researching the impact of emerging military technologies on strategy. He is also a project manager at the Centre for Information Resilience, which a focus on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
